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Abstract
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-
form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing
on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of com-
munication between the players and the mediator. Motivated
by the hardness results on the computation of normal-form
correlated equilibria, we introduce the notion of normal-form
coarse correlated equilibrium, extending the definition of
coarse correlated equilibrium to sequential games. We show
that, in two-player games without chance moves, an opti-
mal (e.g., social welfare maximizing) normal-form coarse
correlated equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time,
and that in general multi-player games (including two-player
games with Chance), the problem is NP-hard. For the for-
mer case, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm based on
the ellipsoid method and also propose a more practical one,
which can be efficiently applied to problems of considerable
size. Then, we discuss how our algorithm can be extended to
games with Chance and games with more than two players.
Introduction
The computational study of adversarial interactions
is a central problem in Artificial Intelligence, aim-
ing at finding players’ optimal strategies and pre-
dicting the most likely outcome of a game. A vast
body of literature focuses on the computation of
Nash Equilibria (NEs), mainly in two-player zero-sum
games (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009). This setting is
well understood and, recently, some remarkable results
have been achieved by, e.g., Brown and Sandholm (2017a;
2017b). While relevant, this model is rather restrictive, as
many practical scenarios are not zero-sum and involve more
than two players, and it presents some weaknesses when
used as a prescriptive tool, in particular in general-sum
games. Indeed, when multiple NEs coexist, the model
assumes the lack of communication between the players,
preventing them from synchronizing their strategies.
In practical situations where some form of communica-
tion is possible, solution concepts different from that of
NE are required. The main alternative is the Correlated
Equilibrium (CE), introduced by Aumann (Aumann 1974).
In a CE, a device (i.e., a trusted external mediator) draws
strategy profiles from a known joint probability distribution
and privately communicates them to each player. The prob-
ability distribution induces an equilibrium if each player has
no incentive to choose a different strategy from the recom-
mended one, assuming the other players would not deviate
either. A variation on the CE is the Coarse Correlated
Equilibrium (CCE), introduced in (Moulin and Vial 1978),
which only prevents deviations happening before knowing
the device’s recommendation. In normal-form games,
CEs and CCEs enjoy some appealing properties that
make them plausible solution concepts in many practi-
cal scenarios. Specifically, they arises from simple and
natural learning dynamics (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000;
Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi 2006), and they can be com-
puted via linear programming on any normal-form
game in polynomial time (assuming the number of
players is fixed). Moreover, price-of-anarchy anal-
yses show that coarse correlated equilibria char-
acterizing outcomes of no-regret learning dynam-
ics have near-optimal welfare (Roughgarden 2009;
Hartline, Syrgkanis, and Tardos 2015). While a CE
can be found in polynomial time in some classes
of succinctly representable multi-player games,
finding an optimal CE in these games is, in gen-
eral, NP-hard (Papadimitriou and Roughgarden 2008;
Jiang and Leyton-Brown 2015). A similar result also
holds for the problem of finding an optimal CCE.
Barman and Ligett (2015) show that for graphical, poly-
matrix, congestion, and anonymous games the problem is
NP-hard.
Sequential games allow for richer forms of interac-
tion among the players than normal-form games, which
lead to different forms of correlation whose general
understanding is still limited. Most of the works in
this area focus on specific classes of games, such as
Bayesian games (Forges 1993; Forges 2006) and multi-
stage games (Myerson 1986; Forges 1986). In these spe-
cific settings, the main solution concepts studied in the
literature are the Normal-Form Correlated Equilibrium
(NFCE), the Agent-Form Correlated Equilibrium (AFCE),
and the Communication-Equilibrium. The first two equi-
libria only allow for a unidirectional communication
from the device to the players, while the third equilib-
rium allows for bidirectional communication. The only
known results for general extensive-form games are due
to von Stengel and Forges (2008), who propose the notion
of Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium (EFCE). The
complex structure of extensive-form games significantly in-
creases the computational effort required for correlation, as
finding an optimal NFCE is NP-hard even with two play-
ers (von Stengel and Forges 2008). An optimal EFCE can
be found efficiently in two-player games without Chance
moves but, in games with three or more players (includ-
ing Chance), finding an EFCE (or an AFCE) is NP-
hard (von Stengel and Forges 2008). The only positive re-
sult for multi-player games is a polynomial-time algorithm
to find an EFCE (Huang and von Stengel 2008).
Correlated equilibria in which recommendations are
drawn before the game starts are known as ex ante CEs.
These equilibria require only unilateral communication
from the device to the players. NFCE, AFCE, and EFCE
belong to this family and differ in the time at which the rec-
ommendations are communicated to players. Specifically,
the NFCE requires, for each player, a single interaction
with the mediator taking place before the beginning of the
game, whereas AFCE and EFCE require a message for each
information set reached during the game. As a consequence,
AFCE and EFCE are not suited for problems where the
agents have limited communication capabilities, a situation
which is frequent in practice. This is the case, for instance,
of collusion in bidding, where communication during the
auction is illegal, and coordinated swindling in public (see
also the recent work by Farina et al. (Farina et al. 2018)).
Different forms of correlation have been explored when a
team of players faces an adversary (Basilico et al. 2017c;
Basilico et al. 2017a; Basilico et al. 2017b;
Celli and Gatti 2018; Farina et al. 2018). This setting,
also known as ex ante coordination, is quite different from
ours. Our notion of correlation is more flexible as any player
may have different objectives. Therefore, in our correlation
setting, individual players have to be incentivized to follow
the recommendations of the mediator. In contrast, in the
ex ante coordination setting there is no need for incentive
constraints since team members share their final rewards.
Original Contributions
In this paper, we focus on equilibria requiring a low level of
communication. A natural question is whether correlation
can be reached efficiently when agents have limited com-
munication capabilities, i.e., when they cannot receive mes-
sages during the execution of the game.1 Motivated by the
hardness result for the NFCE, we introduce the notion of
Normal-Form Coarse Correlated Equilibrium (NFCCE) as
the extension of CCE to sequential games.
We prove that, unlike the NFCE, the problem of find-
ing an optimal NFCCE admits a polynomial-time algorithm
for two-player games without Chance moves. In particular,
we devise a hybrid formulation (combining the normal and
the sequence forms) for the problem of computing an opti-
mal NFCCE featuring a polynomial number of constraints
and an exponential number of variables. We then provide a
polynomial-time separation oracle which, thanks to the el-
1This rules out the possibility of employing an EFCE.
lipsoid algorithm (Khachiyan 1980), allows us to show that
an optimal NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time.
We also show that this approach cannot be extended to more
general settings, illustrating that with more than two players,
including Chance, the problem becomes NP-hard.
We describe a practical algorithm to compute an opti-
mal NFCCE based on column generation—a variation of
the simplex method in which the variables (columns) of the
problem are introduced one at a time. We devise different
oracles to solve the corresponding pricing problem. In par-
ticular, we provide a polynomial-time oracle suitable for the
two-player setting, and an oracle based on a Mixed Integer
Linear Program (MILP). Then, we show how to adapt the
MILP oracle to the case of two-player games with Nature,
and to general multi-player games.
Preliminaries
We briefly introduce several of the basic concepts we use
in the rest of the paper. Further details can be found
in (Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2009).
Game Representations
An extensive-form game Γ has a finite set of playersN and
a finite set of actions A. Exogenous stochasticity is repre-
sented through a non-strategic player c (the nature or chance
player). V is the set of non-terminal decision nodes, and
Vi ⊆ V is the set of decision nodes belonging to player
i ∈ N ∪ {c}. The set of terminal nodes (leaves) is de-
noted by L. The function ι : V → N ∪ {c} associates
each decision node with the player acting at it. The func-
tion ρ : V → 2A is the action function, assigning with each
decision node a set of available actions. The successor func-
tion is denoted by χ : V × A → V ∪ L. Let Ui : L → R
be the utility function of each each i ∈ N . Moreover, let
U = {Ui}i∈N . Finally, for each i ∈ N ∪ {c} let Hi be an
information partition of Vi such that decision nodes within
the same information set h ∈ Hi are not distinguishable by
player i. We write H = {Hi}i∈N∪{c}. The a function πc is
such that πc(h, a) is the fixed probability with which chance
selects a at h ∈ Hc. Moreover, ρ(h) denotes the set of ac-
tions available at h ∈ Hi. We remark that, by definition,
ρ(x1) = ρ(x2) = ρ(h) for any player i ∈ N ∪{c}, informa-
tion set h ∈ Hi, and x1, x2 ∈ h. In this paper, we focus on
games with perfect recall, i.e., games where, at each stage,
all the players recall all the information acquired at earlier
stages.
An extensive-form game can be equivalently represented
in normal-form. Let Pi = ×h∈Hiρ(h) be the set of pure
normal-form plans of player i ∈ N . A normal-form plan
p ∈ Pi specifies an action per information set of player i.
The normal-form of an extensive-form game is character-
ized by the same set of players N , actions P = ×i∈NPi,
and the set of utility functions U ′ = {U ′i}i∈N . Function
U ′i : P → R denotes the expected payoff obtained by
marginalizing with respect to πc. The reduced normal form
is obtained by deleting duplicated strategies from the normal
form.
StrategyRepresentations. A normal-form strategy σi for
i ∈ N is defined as the function σi : Pi → ∆
|Pi|. We de-
note by Σi the normal-form strategy space of player i. A
correlated (joint) normal-form strategy σ ∈ Σ is defined
as σ : P → ∆|P |. The size of a normal-form strategy
is exponential in the size of the extensive-form tree. This
shortcoming can be overcome by exploiting the sequence
form (von Stengel 1996), whose size is linear in the size of
the game tree.
The sequence form decomposes strategies into sequences
of actions and their realization probabilities. A sequence for
player i, associated with a node x of the game, is the subset
of A specifying player i’s actions on the path from the root
to x. We denote the set of sequences of player i by Qi. A
sequence is said terminal if it leads to a terminal node for
at least a set of sequences of the other players. The set of
terminal sequences of player i is denoted by Qi. Moreover,
we denote by q∅ the fictitious sequence leading to the root
node and, for each action a ∈ A and sequence q ∈ Qi,
we denote by qa ∈ Qi the extended sequence obtained by
appending action a to q.
A sequence-form strategy, said realization plan, is a func-
tion ri : Qi → R associating each sequence q ∈ Qi with its
probability of being played. A well-defined sequence-form
strategy is such that ri(q∅) = 1 for each i ∈ N and, for each
h and sequence q leading to h,−ri(q)+
∑
a∈ρ(h) ri(qa) = 0
and ri(q) ≥ 0. These constraints are linear in the number
of sequences and can be compactly written as Fi ri = fi,
where Fi is an |Hi| × |Qi| matrix and f
T
i = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
is a vector of dimension |Hi|. The utility function of player
i is represented by a sparse n-dimensional matrix defined
only for profiles of terminal sequences leading to a leaf
node. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote it by Ui ∈
R
|Q1|×···×|Qn|.
Correlation in Normal-Form Games
Let p−i = (p1, . . . , pi−1, pi+i, . . . , pn) ∈ ×j∈N\{i}Pj .
The classical notion of CE (Aumann 1974) for normal-form
games is:
Definition 1 σ∗ ∈ Σ is a correlated equilibrium of the
normal form game (N,P, U ′) if, for every i ∈ N and
pi, p
′
i ∈ Pi, the following holds:∑
p−i∈P−i
σ∗(pi, p−i) (U
′
i(pi, p−i)− U
′
i(p
′
i, p−i)) ≥ 0.
A CE can be interpreted in terms of a mediator who, ex ante
the play, draws (p1, . . . , pn) according to the publicly known
σ∗ and privately communicates each recommendation pi to
the corresponding player.
Another possibility is enforcing protection against devi-
ations of players which are independent from the sampled
outcome. This can be done though the notion of coarse cor-
related equilibrium (Moulin and Vial 1978).
Definition 2 σ∗ ∈ Σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium of a
normal-form game (N,P, U ′) if, for every i ∈ N and p′i ∈
Pi, the following holds:∑
pi∈Pi
∑
p−i∈P−i
σ∗(pi, p−i) (U
′
i(pi, p−i)− U
′
i(p
′
i, p−i)) ≥ 0.
CCEs differ from CEs in that a CCE only requires that fol-
lowing the suggested action is a best response in expectation
before the recommended action is actually revealed. More-
over, we recall that every CE is also a CCE while the con-
verse is, in general, not true.
An optimal CCE may lead to a social welfare arbitrarily
larger than the social welfare provided by the optimal CE on
the same game. Figure 1 reports a normal-form game where
this happens (k > 1).
a12 a
2
2 a
3
2
a11 k, 0 −k
2, 0 −k2, 1
a21 −k
2, 0 1, 0 −k2,−1
Figure 1: Example on the difference between CE and CCE.
The joint strategy profile assigning probability 1/2 to
(a11, a
1
2) and (a
2
1, a
2
2) is the CCE maximizing the social wel-
fare of the players, which is (k + 1)/2. The unique optimal
CE is the probability distribution assigning probability 1 to
(a21, a
2
2), providing a social welfare of 1 independently of
k. Therefore, for increasing values of k, an optimal CCE al-
lows the players to reach a social welfare which is arbitrarily
larger than the social welfare reached through the optimal
CE.
Correlation in General Extensive-Form Games
We review the main notions of correlation for general
extensive-formgames. In this general setting, it is customary
to consider ex ante CEs, i.e., correlated equilibria in which
an action profile is sampled before the game is played. In
this paper, we focus on the following solution concepts:
Definition 3 A normal-form correlated equilibrium
(normal-form coarse correlated equilibrium) of an
extensive-form game Γ is a correlated equilibrium (coarse
correlated equilibrium) of the reduced normal-form game
equivalent to Γ.
In these two solution concepts, the entire vector of recom-
mendations specifying one action per information set is re-
vealed to the players before the game starts. Thus, once the
recommendation is received each player commits to playing
a pure strategy.
Informally, an AFCE (Forges 1993) is a CE of the agent-
form game equivalent to the given extensive-form game.
In the agent form of the game, moves are chosen by a
different agent per information set of the player. In an
EFCE (von Stengel and Forges 2008), each recommenda-
tion is assumed to be in a sealed envelope and is revealed
only when the player reaches the relevant information set
(i.e., the information set where she can make that move).
The main difference between EFCE and NFCE/NFCCE is
that the former requires recommendations to be delivered
during the game execution, thus being more demanding in
terms of communication requirements. It is crucial to notice
that the size of the signal that has to be sampled is the same,
and it has polynomial size (one action per information set).
Letting S◦ be the set of equilibria of type ◦ of a given
game, we have: SNFCE ⊆ SEFCE ⊆ SNFCCE ⊆ SAFCE .
See von Stengel and Forges (2008) for further details.
In the next section, we study the problems of comput-
ing an NFCE and an NFCCE maximizing the social wel-
fare (i.e., the cumulative utility of the players). We refer to
them as NFCE-SW and NFCCE-SW. The generalization
of our results to the case in which one searches for an equi-
libriummaximizing a linear combination of the players’ util-
ity, omitted here for reasons of space, is straightforward.
Complexity of an Optimal NFCCE
We show that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for
solving the NFCCE-SW problem with two players. First,
we provide a compact formulation for the problem. Then,
we describe a polynomial-time algorithm for solving it.
Problem Formulation
Given an extensive-formgameΓ, a direct application of Def-
inition 3 yields a Linear Programming problem (LP) with an
exponential number of variables and an exponential number
of constraints. We provide the following result:
Lemma 1 The NFCCE-SW problem for an extensive-form
game Γ can be formulated as an LP with an exponential
number of variables but only a polynomial number of con-
straints.
To prove the lemma, we provide a hybrid representation
which exploits the tree structure of the problem combin-
ing both the normal form and the sequence form. Let rpi ∈
{0, 1}|Qi| be a |Qi|-dimensional column vector represent-
ing the pure realization plan for player i ∈ N that is real-
ization equivalent to pi ∈ Pi.
2 We recall that every plan of
the reduced normal form is realization equivalent to exactly
one pure realization plan, see von Stengel (1996). In the fol-
lowing and when not differently specified, Ui denotes the
sequence-form utility matrix of player i.
According to Definition 2, the constraints describing an
NFCCE for Player 1 can be written as follows (for Player 2,
the constraints are analogous):∑
p1∈P1
∑
p2∈P2
σ(p1, p2)U
′
1(p1, p2)−
∑
p1∈P1
∑
p2∈P2
σ(p1, p2)U
′
1(p
′
1, p2) ≥ 0 ∀p
′
1 ∈ P1.
The first term is the expected utility of Player 1 at the equi-
librium. Let v1 be the |H1|-dimensional vector of variables
of the dual of the best-response problem in sequence form.
By definition of sequence form, fT1 v1 is equal to the first
component of v1, whose value corresponds to the utility of
2A realization plan is realization equivalent to a normal-form
plan if, for any strategy profile of the other players, they enforce the
same probability distribution over the terminal nodes of the game
tree.
Player 1 at the equilibrium. Then:

∑
p1∈P1
∑
p2∈P2
σ(p1, p2)U
′
1(p1, p2) = f
T
1 v1
fT1 v1 −
∑
p1∈P1
∑
p2∈P2
σ(p1, p2)U
′
1(p
′
1, p2) ≥ 0 ∀p
′
1 ∈ P1
.
The second term of the above inequalities can be written as
∑
p2∈P2

 ∑
p1∈P1
σ(p1, p2)

 U ′1(p′1, p2).
Letting σ¯2(p2) =
∑
p1∈P1
σ(p1, p2), σ¯2 ∈ ∆
|P2| can
be interpreted as the prior probability with which plan p2
is played by Player 2. σ¯2 can be written as the follow-
ing realization-equivalent sequence-form strategy: r¯2 =∑
p2∈P2
σ¯(p2)rp2 , which is a valid realization plan due
to convexity. Now, we only need to show that fT1 v1 is
not strictly smaller than the value of the best response of
Player 1 given the strategy r¯2 of Player 2. By exploiting the
dual of the best-response problem in sequence form, this is
equivalent to showing FT1 v1 − U1 r¯2 ≥ 0. Thus, expanding
r¯2 and deriving the equilibrium constraints for Player 2 we
obtain the following mathematical program:
max
σ≥0,v1,v2
∑
(p1,p2)∈P1×P2
σ(p1, p2) r
T
p1
(U1 + U2) rp2 (1)
∑
(p1,p2)∈P1×P2
σ(p1, p2) r
T
p1
Ui rp2 = f
T
i vi ∀i ∈ N (2)
FT1 v1 − U1
( ∑
p2∈P2
( ∑
p1∈P1
σ(p1, p2)
)
rp2
)
≥ 0 (3)
FT2 v2 − U
T
2
( ∑
p1∈P1
( ∑
p2∈P2
σ(p1, p2)
)
rp1
)
≥ 0 (4)
∑
(p1,p2)∈P1×P2
σ(p1, p2) = 1. (5)
This formulation constitutes a proof of Lemma 1 as it em-
ploys a polynomial number of constraints (namely, |Q1| +
|Q2|+ 3) and an exponential number of variables.
Efficient Algorithm
The following lemma will be employed to prove our cen-
tral result. It shows that a player can reason in a best-
response fashion to minimize the utility of the other player
weighted by an arbitrary distribution, while also guarantee-
ing the reachability of a given terminal node.
Lemma 2 Given a generic two-player extensive-form game
Γ, an outcome ℓ ∈ L, and a vector ζ ∈ R|Q1|, the problem
of finding p2 ∈ P2 under the constraints that
• there exists some p1 ∈ P1 s.t. (p1, p2) leads to outcome ℓ
and
• ζT U1 rp2 is minimized
can be solved in polynomial time. The same holds when the
two players are interchanged.
Proof. Let us focus on the case in which we look for p2 ∈
P2. First, define U¯1 s.t. U¯1(q1, q2) := ζ(q1)U1(q1, q2) for
each (q1, q2) ∈ Q1 × Q2. Then, let Γ¯ be the extensive-
form game obtained from Γ by substituting Player 1’s utility
function with U¯1. Given Γ¯, denote by (q
ℓ
1, q
ℓ
2) the pair of se-
quences identifying ℓ, and byHℓi the set of information sets
of player i encountered in sequence qℓi . Algorithm 1 returns
the set of actions (A′i) forming a plan of the normal-form
game (not reduced) equivalent to Γ¯.
Algorithm 1 Constrained-plan-search
1: function C-PLAN-SEARCH(x, Γ¯, i, qℓi ,H
ℓ
i ,A
′
i) ⊲ i is the player for
which we want to find a plan,A′i is the temporary set (initially empty) of actions
of i selected
2: ν ← K ⊲K is a sufficiently large constant
3: a′ ←null
4: if x is terminal then
5: return (U¯−i(x),A′i)
6: else
7: if x ∈ V−i then
8: for y ∈ x.child do
9: ν+ = C-PLAN-SEARCH(y, Γ¯, i, qℓi , H
ℓ
i , A
′
p).val
10: return (ν, A′i)
11: else
12: if ∃h ∈ Hℓi : x ∈ h then
13: a′ ← action specified by qℓi
14: ya′ ← child of x reached through a
′
15: ν = C-PLAN-SEARCH(ya′ ,Γ
′, i, qℓi , H
ℓ
i , A
′
i).val
16: else
17: for y ∈ x.child do
18: temp ← C-PLAN-SEARCH(y, Γ¯, i, qℓi , H
ℓ
i , A
′
i)
19: if temp.val < ν then
20: ν ← temp.val
21: a′ ← a ∈ ρ(x) : χ(x, a) = y
22: return(ν, A′i ∪ {a
′})
To retrieve A′i, Algorithm 1 performs a depth-first traver-
sal of the tree while keeping track of the value to be mini-
mized at each decision node (ν) and selecting actions while
moving backwards. Then, p2 can be computed by travers-
ing the tree from the root, and selecting actions according to
those specified in A′2. 
Let us focus on the dualD of LP (1)–(6):
Lemma 3 D admits a polynomial-time separation oracle.
Proof. Let αi ∈ R, for all i ∈ N , be the dual variables
of constraints (2), β1 ∈ R
|Q1| the dual variables of con-
straints (3), β2 ∈ R
|Q2| the dual variables of constraints (4),
and γ ∈ R the dual variable of constraint (5). With n = 2,
D is an LP with a number of variables (|Q1| + |Q2| + 3)
polynomial in the size of the tree and an exponential (|P1 ×
P2| + |H1| + |H2|) number of constraints. We show that,
given a vector z¯ = (α¯1, α¯2, β¯1, β¯2, γ¯), the problem of ei-
ther finding a hyperplane separating z¯ from the set of feasi-
ble solutions to D or proving that no such hyperplane exists
can be solved in polynomial time. Since the number of dual
constraints corresponding to the primal variables vi is linear,
these constraints can be checked efficiently for violation.We
are left with the problem of determining whether any of the
following constraints, defined for all (p1, p2) ∈ P1 × P2, is
violated:
rTp1 U1 rp2 α¯1+r
T
p1
U2 rp2 α¯2+β¯
T
1 U1 rp2+r
T
p1
U2 β¯2+γ¯ ≥
rTp1 (U1 + U2) rp2 .
Let us consider the separation problem of finding an in-
equality ofD which is maximally violated at z¯. The problem
reads:
min
(p1,p2)∈P1×P2
{
rTp1 ((α¯1 − 1)U1 + (α¯2 − 1)U2) rp2+
+ β¯T1 U1 rp2 + r
T
p1
U2 β¯2
}
.
A pair p1, p2 yielding a violated inequality exists iff the sep-
aration problem admits an optimal solution of value < −γ¯.
One such pair (if any) can be found in polynomial time
by enumerating over the (polynomially many) possible out-
comes ℓ ∈ L of the game. For each of them, we look for the
pair (pℓ1, p
ℓ
2) minimizing the objective function of the sep-
aration problem, halting as soon as a pair (p′1, p
′
2) yielding
a violated constraint is found. If the procedure terminates
without finding any suitable pair, we deduce that no violated
inequalities exist and D has been solved. First, notice that
rTp1((α¯1− 1)U1+(α¯2− 1)U2)rp2 is constant for the family
of pairs identifying ℓ ∈ L. Therefore, we can consider an in-
dividual subproblem for each player (i.e., we can find pℓ1 and
pℓ2 independently). Hence, for each outcome ℓ and for each
player i the corresponding pℓi can be found in polynomial
time due to Lemma 2. 
The following theorem shows that, in certain cases, the
NFCCE-SW problem can be solved efficiently:
Theorem 4 Given an extensive-form game Γ with n = 2
players and without chance moves, an NFCCE maximizing
the social welfare can be computed in time polynomial in the
size of the game tree.
Proof. Lemma 3 shows that there exists a polynomial-time
separation oracle for D. Then, D can be solved in polyno-
mial time via the ellipsoid method due to the equivalence
between optimization and separation (Khachiyan 1980;
Gro¨tschel, Lova´sz, and Schrijver 1981). As the method
solves, in polynomial time, a primal-dual system encom-
passing not justD but also its primal problemNFCEE-SW,
it also produces, simultaneously, an optimal solution to the
latter. 
Negative Result
The approach that we presented here cannot be extended to
gameswith two players and the chance player as, upon intro-
ducing the latter, the problem transitions from polynomially
solvabile to NP-hard:3
3Other problems in which this transition takes
place are, for example, the problem of computing a
socially optimal EFCE (von Stengel and Forges 2008)
and the problem of deciding if a two-player zero-
sum extensive-form game with perfect recall admits a
pure strategy equilibrium (Blair, Mutchler, and Lent 1996;
Hansen, Miltersen, and Sørensen 2007).
Theorem 5 Computing an NFCCE maximizing the social
welfare is NP-hard even in extensive-form games with two
players, chance moves, and binary outcomes.
Proof Sketch. A construction introduced
by von Stengel and Forges (von Stengel and Forges 2008)
can be employed. The reduction is fromSAT, whose generic
instance is a Boolean formula φ in conjunctive normal form
with η clauses and ν variables. Given φ, we build an
auxiliary game Γφ, of size proportional to that of the
boolean formula, following (von Stengel and Forges 2008,
Theorem 1.3). Γφ admits a pure strategy guaranteeing a
social welfare of 2 if and only if φ is satisfiable. Otherwise,
the maximum expected social welfare cannot be more than
2(1 − 1/η). A pure strategy maximizing the social welfare
is also an NFCCE, since no ex ante deviation would result in
an increase in the player’s utility, being it already maximal.
Then, finding a solution to NFCCE-SW in polynomial time
would imply the existence of a polynomial time algorithm
for SAT, which leads to a contradiction, unless P=NP. 
Notice that, when considering the separation problem of D,
working with chance is hard because the first term of the ob-
jective function of the separation problem is no longer con-
stant when the outcome is fixed. In the case with n > 2 and
no chance moves, one would have to determine the joint best
response of two player a time (to maximize the terms of the
objective function of the separation problem following the
first one), which is NP-hard (von Stengel and Forges 2008).
A Practical Algorithm
Due to being based on the ellipsoid method (which, while
being a powerful theoretical tool, is well-known to be inef-
ficient in practice), the algorithm that we used in the proof
of Theorem 4 is not appealing from a practical perspective.
We propose, here, a computationally more efficient method
based on the simplex method to compute optimal NFCCEs
via a column generation technique. The focus on two-player
games is motivated by the negative result in the previous
section.
Let x be a vector containing the variables of LP (1)–(6):
xT = (σ(p′1, p
′
2), . . . , σ(p
′′
1 , p
′
2), . . .︸ ︷︷ ︸
|P1×P2|
, vT1 , v
T
2 , s
T
1 , s
T
2 ),
where, for each i = 1, 2, vi is defined as in the proof of
Lemma 1 and si is a |Qi|-dimensional column vector of
slack variables. The cost vector c associated with the vari-
ables is:
cT = ([U ′1(p
′
1, p
′
2) + U
′
2(p
′
1, p
′
2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
σ(p′
1
,p′
2
)
, . . . , 0, . . . , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
|H1|+|H2|+|Q1|+|Q2|
),
where U ′i is the utility matrix of the reduced normal-form
game. We compactly rewrite the constraints of LP (1)–(6) in
standard form as M x = b, where bT = (1, 0, . . . , 0) is a
vector of dimension (|Q1| + |Q2| + 3). We denote the j-th
column ofM byM(·,j).
The algorithm works in two phases, determining, first, a
basic feasible solution and, then, iteratively improving it un-
til an optimal one is found. The crucial component of the
algorithm is an oracle for solving, given a basic feasible so-
lution to LP (1)–(6), the problem (we refer to it as LRC) of
finding a variable with the largest reduced cost. Notice that
Theorem 4 already implies the tractability of the problem
of finding the variable with the maximum reduced cost—the
so-called (primal) pricing problem, as it is equivalent to find-
ing a maximally violated constraint in the dual D. Hence:
Corollary 5.1 LRC can be solved in polynomial-time.
Letting cj be the cost associated with the j-th component
of x and letting cB be the vector of costs of the basic vari-
ables, the j-th reduced cost is:
cj = cj − c
T
B B
−1M(·,j), (6)
where B = [M(·,j′),M(·,j′′), . . .] for each index j
′, j′′, . . .
corresponding to a basic variable. We rely on the following
polynomial-time oracle, P-LRC, described in Algorithm 2
(another oracle is presented in the next section).
First, notice that, given a basic feasible solution, cTBB
−1
is equal to a vector (call it ζ) of dimension (|Q1| + |Q2| +
3), computable in polynomial time (Line 4). By employing
the same notation as the one adopted for the dual variables
in the proof of Lemma 3, ζT = (β¯1, β¯2, α¯1, α¯2, γ¯), where
β¯i is the vector of dual variables of constraints (3) and (4),
α¯i are the dual variables of constraints (2), and γ¯ is that of
constraint (5).
Algorithm 2 P-LRC
1: function P-LRC(Γ,M , c, B)
2: J ← ∅
3: ∀j, c¯j ←∞
4: ζ ← cTBB
−1
5: for j ∈ {|P1 × P2|+ 1, . . . , |c|} do
6: c¯j ← cj − ζM(·,j)
7: J ← J ∪ {j}
8: for ℓ ∈ L do
9: pˆi ← C-PLAN-SEARCH(ℓ, β¯i), ∀i ∈ N
10: jˆ ← index of σ(pˆ1, pˆ2) in c
11: c¯jˆ ← cjˆ − ζM(·,jˆ)
12: J ← J ∪ {jˆ}
13: j∗ = argmaxj∈J c¯j
14: return j∗
The reduced costs of the variables vi and si can be com-
puted directly by definition since their number is polyno-
mial in the size of the tree (Lines 5 to 7). We are left with
the problem of evaluating the reduced costs of the σ(·, ·)
variables. P-LRC enumerates the outcomes of the game
(Line 8). Since all the pairs of plans identifying ℓ have the
same cj , the problem of minimizing ζ
TM(·,j) amounts to
finding a pair (p1, p2) minimizing (β¯1U1rp2 + β¯2U
T
2 rp1).
The problem can be split into a subproblem per player,
and solved through Algorithm 1, which we presented in the
proof of Lemma 2 (Line 9, where we simplified the signa-
ture of C-PLAN-SEARCH for ease of notation). By apply-
ing this procedure for each of the outcomes and selecting,
among the resulting pairs, the one with the largest reduced
cost (Line 13), we are able to determine the new variable
entering the basis in polynomial time.
The two phases of the overall algorithm are the following
ones, and both adopt P-LRC:
Phase 1: finding a feasible point. A basic feasible so-
lution to NFCCE-SW is determined through an auxiliary
problem with artificial variables, where a new variable is in-
troduced for each equality constraint, and their sum is min-
imized in the objective function. If some artificial variable
with index j¯ is found in the optimal basis of the auxiliary
problem, we can find, in polynomial-time, a variable j of
the original problem to replace it by either maximizing or
minimizing ej¯B
−1M(·,j), where ej¯ is a vector of zeros with
suitable dimension and equal to 1 in position j (the problem
can be solved with Algorithm 1).
Phase 2: finding an optimal solution. Starting from a
basic feasible solution, the algorithm iteratively improves it
until an optimal solution is found.While, if we were to solve
the problem with a standard implementation of the simplex
method, we would have to compute the reduced cost of all
the nonbasic variables to find one to enter the basis (which
would require exponential time in the size of the game), by
employing P-LRC the next variable to enter the basis can
be found in polynomial time. This follows from the same
reasoning that led to Corollary 5.1.
We remark that, while the two phases require polynomial
time, the bottleneck of the approach is that, at each iteration,
P-LRC has to traverse the game tree twice for each ℓ ∈ L.
To circumvent this issue, we present a second oracle based
on mixed-integer linear programming (see the experimental
evaluation for a comparison between the two approaches).
General Mixed-Integer Oracle
In this section, we describe an oracle (MI-LRC) for com-
puting a solution to LRC by solving a Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP). Differently from P-LRC, MI-LRC does
not need the explicit enumeration of the terminal nodes of
the game, and, furthermore, it can be extended to gameswith
chance and more that two players. We provide, here, a de-
scription of the oracle for the case of a two-player game with
and without chance moves.4
The crucial difference between MI-LRC and P-LRC is
in the way they handle the inspection of the reduced costs
associated with the σ(·, ·) variables. In MI-LRC, lines 8–12
of Algorithm 2 are substituted with an MILP.
Two-player games
Let us first focus on the case of a two-player game with-
out chance moves. Let Ri be a |Qi| × |L| matrix such that
Ri(qi, ℓ) = 1 if qi is on the path from the root to ℓ, and
Ri(qi, ℓ) = 0 otherwise. Let also z be an |L|-dimensional
vector of binary variables. MI-LRC solves the following
4
MI-LRC can be extended to games with n > 2, we omit the
description of this setting due to space constraints.
problem:
max
z∈{0,1}|L|
ri∈R
n
+
(
(1− α¯1)r
T
1 − β¯
T
1
)
U1r2 + r
T
1U2
(
(1− α¯2)r2 − β¯2
)
(7)
Firi = fi ∀i ∈ N (8)
ri ≥ Riz ∀i ∈ N (9)∑
ℓ∈L
z(ℓ) = 1. (10)
The objective function (7) follows from the definition of the
reduced costs (we are looking for a variable whose dual con-
straint is maximally violated). Constraints (9) force the re-
alization plans to select with probability 1 the sequences on
the path to the selected outcome ℓ. Notice that, while the
objective function contains quadratic terms, they only in-
volve binary variables. Therefore, it can be restated as a lin-
ear function after introducing a new variable and four linear
constraints per bilinear term according to the formulation
proposed in (McCormick 1976).
Notice that an optimal realization plan r∗i , solution to MI-
LRC, may not be pure (i.e., there may exist some q ∈ Qi s.t.
r∗i (q) ∈ (0, 1)). Nevertheless, there always exists a pair of
pure realization plans leading to the same terminal node and
granting the same value β¯T1U1r
∗
2 + r
∗T
1 U2β¯2. Once a pair of
pure realization plans has been determined, the reduced cost
associated with it has to be computed according to equa-
tion (6) and compared to the reduced costs of the remaining
variables (Line 13 of Algorithm 2).5
Two-player games with Nature
We denote by (qℓ1, q
ℓ
2, q
ℓ
c) the unique tuple of the sequences
leading to ℓ, where qℓc is a sequence of the chance player.
The crucial point is that, given ℓ ∈ L, there may exist some
ℓ′ ∈ L\{ℓ}, reachable through (qℓ1, q
ℓ
2, q
ℓ′
c ), satisfying q
ℓ′
c 6=
qℓc. MI-LRC can be adapted to this scenario as follows. First,
for each i ∈ N we compute the utility matrices Ui,πc (with
dimension |Q1| × |Q2|) obtained by marginalizing each Ui
with respect to πc. Formally, denoting by rc the realization
plan defined over the sequences of the chance player which
are realization-equivalent to πc, for each (q1, q2) ∈ Q1×Q2
we have Ui,πc(q1, q2) =
∑
qc∈Qc
rc(qc)Ui(q1, q2, qc). Ob-
jective function (7) is then modified by substituting each Ui
with Ui,πc . Moreover, upon denoting by Rc the |Q¯c| × |L|
matrix defined analogously to Ri, it suffices to substitute
each of constraints (10), one per q¯ ∈ Q¯c, with the constraint
Rc,(qc,·)z = 1, where Rc,(qc,·) denotes row qc of Rc. This
way, MI-LRC can be extended to the more demanding set-
ting of games with two-players and chance moves.
Multi-player games
We focus on a game with n = 3, without chance moves.
The oracle can be easily adapted to the setting with n > 3,
and to include the Chance player. Denote by Ui,rj the utility
5It is enough to traverse the tree depth-first, and select se-
quences, among those played with strictly positive probability in
r∗i , following the same reasoning of Algorithm 1.
matrix of player i marginalized with respect to realization
plan rj of player j—notice that the Ui,rj ∈ R
|Qi|×|Qt|, with
i, t ∈ N , and i, t 6= j. The objective function that needs to
be maximized is:
rT1 ((1− α¯1)U1,r3 + (1− α¯2)U2,r3 + (1− α¯3)U3,r3) r2
−β¯T1 U1,r3r2 − β¯
T
2U
T
2,r3r1 − β¯
T
3 U
T
3,r1r2
(11)
The first term of the objective function only depends on
the choice of a single terminal node ℓ ∈ L. The follow-
ing terms can be addressed following the same reasoning
we employed to adapt MI-LRC to the case of a two-player
game with Chance. For example, in −β¯T1U1,r3r2 player 2
and 3 are jointly best-responding against a fixed distribution
of player 1 (β¯1). Then, MI-LRC can be substituted with the
following oracle:
max
(
rT1
(
(1− α¯1)U1,r3 + (1− α¯2)U2,r3
+(1− α¯3)U3,r3
)
r2
−β¯T1 U1,r3r2 − β¯
T
2U
T
2,r3r1 − β¯
T
3 U
T
3,r1r2
) (12)
Firi = fi ∀i ∈ N (13)
z ∈ {0, 1}|L| (14)∑
ℓ∈L
z(ℓ) = 1 (15)
zi ∈ {0, 1}
|L| ∀i ∈ N (16)
Ri,(qi,·)zi = 1 ∀i ∈ N, ∀qi ∈ Q¯i (17)
zi(ℓ) ≥ z(ℓ) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ℓ ∈ L (18)
rj ≥ Rizi ∀i ∈ N, ∀j ∈ N \ {i} (19)
ri ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N (20)
The oracle employs n + 1 |L|-dimensional vectors of bi-
nary variables. Vector z selects a single terminal node (con-
straint 15), determining the value of the first term of the ob-
jective function. Each zi, instead, selects the terminal nodes
reachable through a certain choice of plans of the play-
ers that are best-responding against i (constraint 17). As
an example, z1(ℓ) = 1 iff ℓ is reachable through the cho-
sen (r2, r3). Realization plans are constrained to be consis-
tent with the selected outcomes (constraint 19). Finally, the
choices in z and in each zi have to be mutually consistent
(constraint 18).
Discussion
In this paper, we have studied ex ante correlated equilibria
in extensive-form games with low communication require-
ments. First, we showed that an optimal NFCCE can be com-
puted in polynomial time in two-player games. Moreover,
we have devised a column generation method which allows
for computing solutions iteratively, by employing one of the
two oracles which we have devised for the problem of find-
ing a column with the largest reduced cost. In the future, it
would be interesting experimentally evaluate our techniques,
and to eventually further improve the scalability of ourmeth-
ods to tackle practical problems. Among the possible tech-
niques to achieve this, we mention the adoption of heuristics
for solving our oracle, the use of stabilization techniques,
and the introduction of dominance relationships among the
columns.
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